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FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS
JOHN C. Yoo*
rosby v. National Foreign Trade Council' was the great test of federalism
that never was. To date, some have thought that the Supreme Court's
ongoing reinvigoration of federalism has entailed no truly sweeping
changes in doctrine and no stunning obstacles to the enforcement of fed-
eral policy.2 For example, in its recent cases striking down federal laws as
beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power, the Rehnquist Court claimed
to be staying true to precedent, as it has yet to overrule a single Commerce
Clause case. 3 The anti-commandeering cases, which prohibit the national
government from forcing state executives and legislatures to carry out fed-
eral policies, also entailed no overruling of precedent and no great inno-
vation in doctrine. 4 Even the recent sovereign immunity cases required
the Court to overrule only one shaky opinion.5 The New Federalism has
yet to ask the Court either to move the doctrine in revolutionary directions
or, I would argue, to fundamentally re-orient the balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the states.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall) (on leave); Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel. This
Article represents my personal views, and does not necessarily reflect the official
position of the Department of Justice.
1. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
2. See, e.g.,Jesse H. Choper &John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after
Morrison, 25 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REv. 843, 854 (2000) (emphasizing "limited impact
of Lopez and Morrison themselves on the enforcement of federal policy"); Charles
Fried, Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13, 73 (1995) (noting that Supreme Court
Justices "have been assiduous both to maintain and to demonstrate continuity with
the past... ").
3. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 668-82 (2000) (holding that
congressional statute regulating gender-motivated crimes is unconstitutional be-
cause regulating such crimes is outside scope of Congress' commerce power);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-68 (1995) (holding that Congress did not
have power under Commerce Clause to pass Gun-Free School Zones Act because
regulation had nothing to do with commerce).
4. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that
Congress cannot enact statute that compels state officials to carry out or administer
federal regulatory scheme); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)
(holding that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the states to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program").
5. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (holding that
Congress has authority under Commerce Clause to make states liable for money
damages in federal courts pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
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Crosby potentially presented the Court with just that opportunity. The
First Circuit below had rested its decision striking down Massachusetts'
Burma sanctions law on a particularly expansive form of federal power:
dormant foreign affairs preemption. 6 First appearing in Zschernig v.
Miller,7 this doctrine requires federal courts to invalidate state laws-in the
absence of any federal preempting statutes or actions-that interfere with
the national government's power over international relations.8 Zschernigis
not just a prudential or procedural rule; it symbolizes a deeper structural
understanding of the balance of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments. Zschernig rests on the idea that the nation preceded the states
and that, therefore, the federal government is vested with all of the powers
of national sovereignty-a notion that can trace itself not just to Justice
Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,9 but also to the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton and the High Fed-
eralists of the framing period. 10 Zschernig thus reverses the presumption
of the Tenth Amendment and the implications of a Constitution of lim-
ited federal powers. Instead, this decision reserves to the federal govern-
ment all powers in foreign affairs not specifically granted to the states."l
Just as the dormant Commerce Clause, from which it draws obvious
strength, has come under criticism by some of theJustices,1 2 so too has the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine recently received sharp academic ques-
tioning by those who argue that it makes no sense in light of the Court's
recent federalism decisions.13
In Crosby, however, the Court avoided the question of whether the
national government's dominance in foreign affairs would survive in this
new age of federalism. Instead of revisiting Zschernig, writing for the
Court, Justice Souter found that the Massachusetts law conflicted with a
6. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66-78 (1st Cir.
1999) (holding that Massachusetts Burma law violates Foreign Commerce Clause
because it excessively interferes in foreign affairs).
7. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
8. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432 (holding Oregon statue unconstitutional be-
cause it was "an intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress").
9. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
10. S'e generally THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (defending pro-
posed constitution and explaining its provisions).
11. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 (stating that "[tihe Oregon law does ...
illustrate the dangers which are involved if each State ... is permitted to establish
its own foreign policy").
12. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
609-20 (1997) (Thomas,J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's use of dormant Com-
merce Clause).
13. See, e.g.,Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1617-18 (noting that foreign affairs law is seemingly "immune" to
recent federalism "revolution"); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of States in Foreign
Affairs: The Original Understanding of-Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 341, 392-93 (1999) (discussing lack of foundation in Article I, Section 8 for
dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
[Vol. 46: p. 13411342
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss5/12
FOREIGN AFFAIRs FEDERALISM
federal sanctions law targeted at Burma because the state law stood as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal policy goals. 14 Justice Souter
found that Massachusetts' effort to sanction companies doing business
with Burma interfered with Congress' delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent to control the nation's economic actions against that nation., 5 The
Court further held that Massachusetts' law disrupted the ability of the po-
litical branches to calibrate the exact amount of American force to be used
against Burma. 16 Finally, the Justices concluded that here, state foreign
policies conflicted with the statute's authorization to the President to seek
a comprehensive multilateral solution on the Burma question in coopera-
tion with our trading partners and allies. 17 Rather than rely upon the ap-
parently shaky dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the Court steered to the
safer ground provided by standard conflict preemption doctrine. Under
this doctrine, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause requires federal courts
to suppress state laws that prevent federal laws from achieving their
goals. 18
While initially it appears that the Court avoided the deeper federalism
questions potentially raised by Crosby, a second glance might suggest that
the decision actually reinforces the notions behind Zschernig. This in part
results from the Court's misinterpretations of the Burma law and its mis-
understanding of the general allocation of the foreign affairs power
among the branches of the federal government. The Court found the
Burma law delegated the President power to impose economic sanctions
upon Burma.19 But the Court failed to realize that the President already
enjoyed that power under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), and under that authority in the past the President enjoyed
the ability to preempt state laws that interfered with his efforts to engage
in international economic warfare. 20 The Court also found that the stat-
ute authorized the President to conduct diplomatic negotiations to
14. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)
("[W] e see the state Burma law as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's
full objectives under the federal Act.").
15. See id. at 373-74 (stating that state statute undermines federal Act's inten-
tion to delegate "effective discretion to the President to control economic sanc-
tions against Burma...").
16. See id. at 380-81 (noting that state statute prevented Legislative and Execu-
tive branches from setting policy regarding Burma).
17. See id. at 382-86 (noting that state statute interferes with Executive's ability
to deal with allies and other foreign sovereigns).
18. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (holding that
Supremacy Clause of Constitution prevents states from adding or taking away from
treaties or statutes constitutionally established by national government).
19. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369 (stating that "the federal Act authorizes the
President to impose further [economic] sanctions").
20. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 670-74 (1981) (holding that
Executive has power to preempt state law under International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act).
13432001]
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achieve a multilateral solution to the Burma problem. 2 1 But of course, as
any student of American foreign relations law knows, the President already
enjoys plenary authority to conduct diplomacy with other nations as he
sees fit. If one reads the federal Burma sanctions law as not really altering
the status quo of federal international economic law, then the Court
would have reached the same result in Crosby regardless of the presence of
a federal statute.
Nonetheless, I think that if the current Court were presented with a
true dormant foreign affairs case, the deeper theory evident in Crosby
might lead to a contrary result. Crosby, it seems to me, is more of a separa-
tion of powers case than a federalism case. Much of the Court's language
does not emphasize the federal government's powers in foreign rela-
tions-instead, it praises the President's powers. It is the President, accord-
ing to the Court, who must enjoy the freedom and discretion to carefully
calibrate national economic sanctions so as to produce the desired
amount of carrot and stick in our international relations. Indeed, in other
cases, such as United States v. Belmont2 2 and Pink v. United States,23 the Court
has preempted state laws that interfered with the President's unilateral
conduct over economic foreign relations, vis-A-vis the Soviet Union. 24 It is
the President whose diplomatic powers would be hampered by Massachu-
setts' Burma sanctions law. Massachusetts violated the Constitution be-
cause it infringed on the President's ability to conduct our foreign
relations, "Within the sphere defined by Congress, then, the statute has
placed the President in a position with as much discretion to exercise eco-
nomic leverage against Burma, with an eye toward national security, as our
law will admit," the Court declared. 25 The Court further stated that "it is
just this plenitude of Executive authority that we think controls the issue
of preemption here."26 And, it added, "Again, the state Act undermines
the President's capacity, in this instance for effective diplomacy." 27 The
Massachusetts law "compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments." 28
The same reasons why the Court favors the President, however, would
lead it to reject a vigorous dormant foreign affairs doctrine. First, let me
sketch out why courts and many scholars have long favored presidential
control of foreign affairs. The obvious reason is that the Executive branch
21. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369 (noting that federal statute authorizes President
to develop comprehensive and multilateral strategy to bring democracy to Burma).
22. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
23. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
24. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 231-33 (striking down state action that interfered with
President's power to establish foreign policy with Soviet Union); Belmont, 301 U.S.
at 325-32 (same).
25. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 375-76.
26. Id. at 376.
27. Id. at 381.
28. Id.
1344 [Vol. 46: p. 1341
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enjoys clear structural superiorities in the conduct of international
relations.
It is helpful here to examine the theories developed by political scien-
tists and economists that attempt to model international relations. Put
simply, these scholars begin with the assumption that the international
system is governed by anarchy in which nations seek to maximize their
security and power. 29 Realists believe that this situation leads nations to
secure their survival through the unilateral buildup of their armed
forces.30 Others, sometimes known as institutionalists, believe that even in
a state of anarchy, nations may engage in forms of cooperation that allow
them to overcome prisoners' dilemmas in areas such as trade and the
environment. 3 1
Despite their differences, both realists and institutionalists assume
that nation-states employ a rational actor approach to national security
decision-making. The primary requirement for the study of national strat-
egy, according to Thomas Schelling's classic work, The Strategy of Conflict, is
"the assumption of rational behavior-not just of intelligent behavior, but
of behavior.., motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calcu-
lation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value
system."32 The nation-state ideally is a rational, unitary decision-maker that
can identify threats, develop responses and evaluate the costs and benefits
which arise from different policy options. 33 The rational actor translates
broad national security interests into more discrete goals, which it then
seeks to achieve by adopting value-maximizing policies and actions.34
International relations scholars have identified several institutional
structures that lead to the effective exercise of power to achieve foreign
policy goals. Nation-states require organizations that recognize the values
and objectives that are to be maximized, that can identify and compare
the costs and benefits of different policy options, that can collect and eval-
uate information, that can communicate policy decisions to arms of the
state, that can communicate with other nations, and that can evaluate re-
sults and receive feedback.35 As Schelling writes, a nation-state would
want "to have a communications system in good order, to have complete
information, or to be in full command of one's own actions or of one's
own assets." 36 While this model, no doubt, is difficult to achieve in the
29. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1979) (defining realism).
30. See id. at 183-92 (describing use of force under realist school of thought).
31. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY. COOPERATION AND Dis-
CORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMv 7-9 (1984) (defining institutionalism).
32. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 4 (1960).
33. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 32-33 (1971) (describing nation-state rational actor paradigm).
34. See id. (explaining ideal national decision-making model for nation-state).
35. See generally id. (describing ideal decision-making national security models
for nation-state).
36. SCHELLING, supra note 32, at 18.
2001] 1345
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real world-bureaucratic or political imperatives may distort policy, cer-
tain issues may allow domestic interests to overcome the national interest
as identified by the rational actor-it remains an ideal that some theorists
believe ought to guide effective foreign policy. 37 It seems obvious that, in
the modern world, only the Presidency meets the requirements of the ra-
tional national actor.
One can see the influences of this ideal even before its formal expres-
sion in recent political science. In Curtiss-Wright, for example, the Court
famously (or notoriously) observed: "In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."38
Quoting from a Senate report, Justice Sutherland further explained that
" [t] he nature of transactions with foreign nations.., requires caution and
unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dis-
patch."'3 9 Such ideas can trace their origins in American political thought
as far back as Alexander Hamilton, who wrote in The Federalist No. 70 that
"[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the pro-
ceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is in-
creased, these qualities will be diminished. '40 As a result, the Framers
vested the President with the Commander-in-Chief power, the power to
make treatises with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the power to
conduct diplomatic relations. 4 1 Therefore, the history of American for-
eign relations and the American presidency has been the story of the ex-
pansion of the Executive's power thanks to its structural abilities to wield
power quickly, effectively and in a unitary manner .42
If we accept this ideal of foreign relations decision-making, then it
seems clear that a vigorous dormant foreign relations doctrine, of the sort
suggested by Zschernig and avoided in Crosby, falls short. If there is any
institution in our national government that would fail the unitary, rational
actor test, it is the federal judiciary. The federal courts operate as a slow,
decentralized, and at times, irrational bureaucracy. Take the makeup of
the federal courts as an example. There are ninety-four district courts,
37. See id. at 16-20 (explaining that rational behavior model is ideal model for
foreign affairs).
38. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
39. Id.
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting President specific foreign affairs
powers).
42. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KoiH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHAR-
INC POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 118-23 (1990) (explaining that struc-
ture of American government allows President to take initiative in foreign affairs);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 35-67 (1973) (describing
rise of unilateral presidential action in sphere of foreign affairs).
1346 [Vol. 46: p. 1341
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composed of at least 647 independent judges. 43 rEach of these courts can
hold ninety-four different opinions concerning the question of whether a
state law interferes with national foreign policy objectives. There are thir-
teen federal courts of appeals, with 179judges.44 Due to the Court's spar-
ing use of its certiorari jurisdiction, these judges represent the court of last
resort for more than 99% of all cases brought in federal court.45 Until the
Supreme Court chooses to intervene, each of these circuit courts of ap-
peals can enforce different opinions on foreign policy and state law.
The federal judiciary is not only decentralized, but also, in compari-
son to the Presidency, it is slow and error-prone. Federal courts are noto-
rious for the lengthy delays-often amounting to years-between the
filing of a case and the issuance of a judgment. Such delay, when com-
bined with decentralization, prevents the judicial system as an organiza-
tion from communicating effectively among its units and correcting
errors. The mechanism within the federal judiciary for such feedback is
the appeal system. 46 If a trial court reaches the wrong decision on foreign
policy, the length of time required to carry out an appeal allows errors to
lay uncorrected for months, if not years. Even if the error is obvious and
clear, parties must engage in further litigation to correct it. Standards of
review designed to conserve the energy of appellate and trial courts-such
as the clearly erroneous standard for fact-finding-mean that errors made
concerning some issues may remain almost impossible to review on
appeal.
Finally, if the Court were to recognize a more vigorous dormant for-
eign affairs power, the nature of the federal judiciary would undermine
the effort to promote rationality in our foreign affairs decision-making.
Federal courts simply do not enjoy the flexibility needed to constantly cal-
culate costs and benefits in foreign policy and to adjust the creation and
implementation of policy to meet changes in those calculations. Once the
courts perceive a mandate arising out of the Constitution or a statute, they
have a duty to promote that federal directive in the context of an Article
III case or controversy. They have no discretion to adjust those policies
43. See The Federal Judiciary Homepage, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.uscourts.gov/faq.html#district (last visited July 3, 2001) (stating number of
federal district courts in United States).
44. See id. (stating number of federal courts of appeals in United States).
45. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2000 (2000)
(stating that for year ending March 31, 2000, 55,678 cases were terminated by
courts of appeals); FindLaw for Legal Professionals, U.S. Supreme Court Opinions:
Cases of 1999 (listing seventy-two cases decided by Supreme Court in 1999), at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/get-
case.pl?court=US&navby=year&year=1999. This means that the Supreme Court's
yearly docket represents only .13% of the caseload handled by the courts of ap-
peals over approximately the same time period.
46. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
125, 125-34 (1972) (explaining that consistency in application of laws is reached
through communications that originate from appeal system).
2001] 1347
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without some command from the political branches, regardless of the
likely effect on American foreign policy. A rational, unitary decision-
maker can take into account new policy goals, new costs and new benefits,
but a federal court cannot. The nature of the litigation process only com-
pounds these problems. Litigation is run by interested parties that have
no obligation to provide all of the information that a rational decision-
maker might need to reach the best policy choice. Rather, litigation may
witness the use of procedures to harass or delay, the failure to reach com-
promises and the creation of greater uncertainty and inconsistency.4 7
Given all of these characteristics in the federal judicial system and the
judicial process, it is not obvious that we should want the courts to make
decisions concerning our foreign policy. Decisions in this area can carry
heavier consequences than domestic issues. If we want to establish an ef-
fective decision-making process for foreign affairs matters, the Court may
wish to consider whether the federal courts are as equally disorganized
and discordant as the states. When it chooses to confront the dormant
foreign affairs power directly, the Court perhaps may decide to defer to
the better-equipped political branches, rather than itself, to make foreign
policy for the nation.
47. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10
J. POL'y ANALYSIS & McMT. 369, 370 (1991) (noting that "adversarial legalism re-
sults in enormously costly, time-consuming, and erratic policy implementation and
dispute resolution ...").
1348 [Vol. 46: p. 1341
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss5/12
